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The World Turned Upside 
Down: The Complex 
Partnership between China 
and Latin America  
Alfredo Toro Hardy (2013). The World Turned Upside Down: The Complex 
Partnership between China and Latin America.  
London/Singapore: World Scientific.
This is an ambitious book that 
addresses a topic of concern for 
academics, politicians, students of 
development, and policymakers. 
Scholarly without being pretentious, 
it not only covers in great detail and 
with an abundance of figures the 
state of Latin American economies 
today, but it also provides detailed 
analysis of the role China is playing 
in this “upside down world”. Ac-
cording to Toro Hardy, we are facing 
a true boulversement of the world 
order as we know it.
Extensive research, reflected in 
the comprehensive bibliography, 
reflects the intellectual density and 
curiosity of Alfredo Toro Hardy: 
diplomat, academic, public intel-
lectual. Questions such as what are 
the engines of growth? Have they 
changed in the last decade? Does 
China offer an alternative model of 
development? Is the US in decline? 
All receive a detailed, and some-
times controversial, treatment. 
This, his latest book, is a continu-
ation of Toro Hardy’s intellectual 
reach. While looking at the whole 
world, his main focus lies where his 
heart is, in Latin America. His argu-
ments are clear and well supported 
by facts and figures. The reader is 
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left in no doubt as to the author’s 
Weltanschauung, which is unavoid-
ably open to challenge.
The book, as Cambridge’s Emeritus 
Professor Geoffrey Hawthorn states 
in his foreword, could be based on 
the premise that “the Cold War is 
over and it is now clear that China 
has won. The United States is by 
most economic measures declin-
ing, and the European Union is in 
difficulty also”. While there can 
be few doubts about the parlous 
state of the European Union, the 
inexorability of China’s rise and 
the decline of the US is less certain. 
Is it indeed “clear” that China has 
“won”? Not if we look at the argu-
ments in two recent books: Linda 
Yueh’s China’s Growth (OUP 2013) 
and Juan Pablo Cardenal and Heri-
berto Araújo’sChina’s Silent Army 
(Allen Lane, 2013). The former sets 
out the reforms that China needs to 
put in place to ensure that growth 
will continue for another three 
decades. 
Toro Hardy’s book is divided into 
four chapters. Chapter 1 offers a 
sweeping review of where we come 
from and where we are and in the 
process reveals both the author’s 
preferences as well as his prejudices. 
In his revision of the last three 
decades, the biggest criticism is 
directed to the “market-oriented 
capitalism imposed during the 
Reagan–Thatcher years”. This 
was purportedly an Anglo-Saxon 
model which excluded the state and 
favoured supposedly unchecked 
markets. In fact, the recent passing 
out of Margaret Thatcher provided 
the opportunity for thorough as-
sessments of her legacy, which 
included debunking the myth that 
she destroyed the manufacturing 
industry in the UK.  Rather than 
an “imposition”, different forms 
of capitalism emerge not only 
as a result of the zeitgeist, but 
of the specific circumstances of 
each country. In an article in the 
Washington Post (11 April 2013) 
Fareed Zakaria noted that it was 
the regulatory, red-tape aspects of 
the state that Mrs Thatcher rolled 
back.  Indeed, during her more than 
a decade in government the role 
of the state in the UK economy 
grew. She supported the National 
Health Service and cut top rate 
of taxes which she identified as 
disincentives for investment, but 
she substantially raised others.  As 
Zakaria says, “Thatcher’s ideas 
resonated because they were an 
effective antidote to the problems 
of the times”, which he then goes 
on to list as “oil shocks, rising 
wages, rocketing inflation, slowing 
productivity and growth, labour 
unrest, high taxes and sclerotic 
state-owned companies”. It was not 
markets that Reagan and Thatcher 
held in awe, but freedom. 
The much maligned Washington 
Consensus could be reappraised 
in the light of today’s successful 
economies.  In its latest report, 
the Inter-American Development 
Bank reinforces this point. Look-
ing at Latin American economies, 
it singles out financial and trade 
liberalisation, privatisation, fis-
cal and labour markets reform as 
the factors that have the greatest 
impact in enhancing productivity 
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and thus, growth (IDB, April 2013, 
p.32). In contrast, Toro Hardy 
blames the Washington Consensus 
and “market fundamentalism” for 
its alleged “devastating effects felt 
around the world”.  It is arguable 
that it was not “fundamentalism” 
but errors in the sequencing and 
pace of the reforms that account 
for an uneven balance. And why 
describe Hayek, von Mises and 
Friedman among others, as “lonely 
preachers of the ‘truth’”? If there is 
one “truth” that they all shared was 
their belief in freedom, and their 
relentless opposition to any form 
of totalitarianism. In contrast the 
“Beijing Consensus” is the result of 
an authoritarian, state-led capital-
ism with no place for the values of 
liberty, justice and rights. 
China’s “victory” is taken as a 
given, as is the decline of the West, 
the title of chapter 2.
Toro Hardy notes what may prove 
the biggest challenge for developed 
economies if they are to avoid a rup-
ture brought about by increasing 
inequality.  As the author remarks, 
“the jobs that are currently being 
created in the United States are 
those relatively low-skilled and 
low-paid that cannot be replaced 
either by offshoring or job-killing 
technologies”. Paradoxically, these 
are precisely the jobs necessary to 
maintain a degree of social cohe-
sion. Poverty has been reduced in 
the world as a result of growth, most 
prominently in China. But inequal-
ity has increased. If inequality is the 
challenge ahead, then lower-skill 
jobs need to be massively created. 
Chapter 3 (“A Dragon in Latin 
lands”) is based on the premise 
that China’s growth is unstoppable, 
and that the “Beijing Consensus” 
may presage what Toro felicitously 
labels “a plurality of modernities”. 
The only problem is that this “plu-
rality” does not include political 
pluralism.  This is where prefer-
ences and prejudices are revealed. 
China’s model seems to indicate 
that growth and poverty reduction 
are possible without the protection 
of rights and the rule of law. It may 
very well be. Whether it is desir-
able is another matter. Moreover, 
authors such as Daron Acemoglu 
and James Robinson (Why Nations 
Fail. The origins of power, prosperity 
and poverty, Profile Books, 2012) 
see this as the stumbling block in 
the forecast of a continuous path in 
China’s mixed state-market model. 
The authors analyse “authoritarian 
growth” in which the resorts of the 
economy are firmly in the grip of 
the Communist party, which still 
controls what giant corporations 
should do, where they should 
invest, and what their targets 
should be. Linda Yueh refers to 
the continuing wide reach of the 
state, albeit much more “opaque” 
in its operation. Transparency and 
accountability, two core values of 
democratic systems, do not form 
part of the Beijing Consensus.
Toro Hardy does not believe that 
the “China model” can or should be 
replicated. His view is a pragmatic 
one: China’s role and influence in 
world trade and investment is un-
deniable. How can Latin America 
countries make the best of it? In 
an impressively researched chapter, 
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the author analyses the reasons why 
there are economic winners and 
losers in the region.
He does not paint an uncritical 
picture of China’s influence:  “But 
even if this emerging economic 
partnership has produced impres-
sive results it does not flow easily, 
at least not from a Latin American 
perspective. Costs as well as ben-
efits are involved in the process 
even for the winners, but together 
with the winners there are losers 
as well. The latter are those Latin 
American countries for whom the 
Chinese juggernaut only spells 
problems.” (p.119). As Toro per-
suasively explains, the main risk, 
and this also includes the winners 
(commodity exporters), is the pat-
tern of investment in infrastructure 
projects that is not too dissimilar to 
that imposed by colonial powers in 
the 19th century (p.171).
In his magisterial review in Chap-
ter 3 of the impact of Spanish 
and Portuguese colonial practices 
in the region, Toro reminds the 
readers of the distinctive features 
that make countries stand apart, 
and he concludes that “leaving 
aside the particularities of the 
different components of Iberian 
America,[…] the truth is that 
there is a strong sense of common 
destiny and solidarity not only 
between Hispanic Americans but 
between them and Brazilians” 
(p.123). The excessive number of 
regional organisations would seem 
to contradict any notion of unity 
or solidarity, as it transpires from 
the Venezuelan inspired ALBA, the 
increasingly protectionist decisions 
of some members of MERCOSUR, 
and the newly-formed Trans-Pacific 
Partnership. 
While there is much to criticise in 
the manner that the United States 
considered its southern neighbours 
for most of the 20th century, can 
we be certain that “from a Latin 
American and Caribbean perspec-
tive, there is much to be thankful 
to China for introducing a new 
element of counterbalance in the 
region”? (p.147). In terms of new 
trade partnerships there is little 
to object.  If, on the other hand, 
China is presented as a version of 
modernity to be emulated, in the 
sea of “plurality of modernities” 
available, then the statement is 
more questionable. The USA can 
be blamed for many things but is 
it fair to also blame Anglo-Saxon 
capitalism and neo-liberal policies? 
One could argue that if the pro-
cess of privatisation undertaken 
in the 1990s, in its preference for 
Spanish-owned businesses, had not 
been driven by anti-Americanism, 
the story would have been differ-
ent. Did Washington Consensus-
inspired policies “massacre” the 
industrial base in the region? The 
largest and most efficient industries 
are Brazilian and Mexican, coun-
tries which have not sailed too far 
from the main recommendations of 
the Washington Consensus. 
Having described where we come 
from and where we are, in Chapter 
4, Toro Hardy sets the roadmap of 
where we are going, provocatively 
asking “Is there a future for Latin 
America”? Future there definitely 
is. Whether it is promising is a 
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more appropriate question. The 
author pointedly singles out total 
factor productivity as the main 
challenge. The facts he presents 
the reader with speak for them-
selves: “North America’s share of 
gross expenditure in research and 
development [in 2005] was 37%, 
Asia’s 31.5%, Europe’s 28.8% and 
Latin America’s 2.6%” (p.182).
Worryingly, the IDB report (2013) 
states that in Latin America tech-
nological innovation, higher skills 
and improved methods of produc-
tion have evolved in a negative way 
during the last 30 years.  This is the 
chapter where Toro Hardy describes 
the social context in Latin America, 
and its shortcomings in the areas 
of education, health, poverty, in-
equality and some of the highest 
indicators of violent criminality in 
the world.
Toro Hardy sees a role for China 
in helping to solve Latin American 
uncertainties in relation to its eco-
nomic future: “Within the context 
of purpose, credibility and efficacy, 
acting as a block becomes essential” 
to negotiate with China (p.217). 
With almost twenty regional agree-
ments, is it realistic to expect that 
countries in Latin America could 
come up with a common stand 
vis-à-vis negotiations with China?
The conclusions are bewildering. 
Globalisation is seen as the result 
of the West and the US putting in 
motion “a market-oriented globali-
sation process that it was unable to 
control and that ended up by erod-
ing its competitive capacity and 
its social stability” (p.221). Thus 
“Developing economies, which 
were submitted to ideologically-
oriented prescriptions and double 
standards by the richer countries, 
ended up by becoming the main 
beneficiaries of this process. This 
unintended result was possible 
thanks to the strength attained by a 
group of developing economies and 
very particularly by China.” Rather 
than “unintended”, one can view 
globalisation as a process of change 
driven by technological innovation, 
and the lowering of trade barriers 
across the world. 
As we have seen, China’s suppos-
edly unstoppable path to great 
power status is a subject of much 
debate.  There are not only doubts 
about China’s ability and willing-
ness to undertake the needed 
reforms that will pull her along in 
the next few decades, but there 
are also the “known unknowns”: 
natural disasters, social upheaval, 
epidemics, environmental catas-
trophes, military adventurism, have 
to be included as possible obstacles 
in its way.  
Alas, China’s supposed “victory” is 
far from certain. While we are told 
a lot about “growth” and economic 
development, values of freedom, 
tolerance, political and civil rights, 
good governance and rule of law 
are never mentioned. By all means 
let us open up the doors to the 
lithium factories, car assemblies 
, infrastructure projects, but let 
us also make sure the values that 
peoples in the West have struggled, 
and are still struggling for centuries 
to achieve are not left behind. After 
all, it was only a century ago that an 
economic crisis in Europe and the 
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US was used by rising totalitarian 
regimes as proof of the decline and 
defunctness of liberal democracies. 
The rest, as we know, is history…
Celia Szusterman
